

Using System-Enforced Determinism to Control Timing Channels

Bryan Ford, Amittai Aviram, Weiyi Wu,
Jose Faleiro, Ramki Gummadi

Yale University

<http://dedis.cs.yale.edu/>


ASPLOS PC Symposium, November 2, 2012

The Long History of Timing Attacks

- **Cooperative attacks** – apply to:
 - Mandatory Access Control (MAC) systems [Kemmerer 83, Wray 91]
 - Decentralized Information Flow Control (DIFC) [Efsthopoulos 05, Zeldovich 06]
- **Non-cooperative attacks** – apply to:
 - Processes/VMs sharing a CPU core [Percival 05, Wang 06, Aciıçmez 07, ...]
 - Including VM configurations typical of clouds [Ristenpart 09]


Cooperative Attacks: Example

Trojan leaks **secret** information by modulating a *timing channel* observable by **unclassified** app



Non-Cooperative Attacks: Example

Apps unintentionally modulate shared resources to reveal secrets when running standard code




Timing Attacks in the Cloud

The cloud *exacerbates* timing channel risks:

1. Routine co-residency
2. Massive parallelism
3. No intrusion alarms → hard to monitor/detect
4. Partitioning defenses defeat elasticity

“Determinating Timing Channels in Compute Clouds”
[CCSW '10]

Towards a "Timing-Hardened Cloud"



Leak-Plugging Approaches


Two broad classes of existing solutions:

- *Tweak specific algorithms, implementations*
 - Equalize AES path lengths, cache footprint, ...
- *Demand-insensitive resource partitioning*
 - Requires *new or modified hardware* in general
 - Partition CPU cores, cache, interconnect, ...
 - Can't oversubscribe, stat-mux resources
 - Not economically feasible in an “elastic” cloud!

Anatomy of a Timing Channel

Two elements required: [Wray 91]

- A *resource* that can be *modulated* by the signaling process (or victim)
- A *reference clock* enabling the attacker to observe, extract the modulated signal




Remove either → no timing channel.

Prior Approaches


Attempt to **eliminate modulation**

- e.g., by partitioning hardware resources



Our Approach


Allow modulation, **eliminate reference clocks**



Our Approach

Allow modulation, **eliminate reference clocks**

- *Dynamic statistical multiplexing allowed*



Timing Information Flow Control

[HotCloud '12]

Adapt IFC to label & control timing channels

Key idea: separate labeling of *state* and *events*

- **State labels** attached to *explicit program state*
 - Represent ownership of information in the *content* of a variable, message, process, etc.
- **Time Labels** attached to *event channels*
 - Represent ownership of information affecting *time* or *rate* events occur in a program

Relies on **enforceable deterministic execution**

Timing Control in Elastic Clouds


Need two key facilities:

- *System-enforced deterministic execution*
 - OS/VMM ensures that a job's outputs depend *only* on job's explicit inputs
- *Pacing queues*
 - Input jobs/messages at any rate
 - Output jobs/messages on a *fixed schedule*

Determinator

A Determinism-Enforcing
Microkernel/Hypervisor


- ***“Efficient System-Enforced Deterministic Parallelism”***
(Best Paper Award, OSDI 2010)




Enforces determinism on **parallel** applications

- Even if user code behaves adversarially
- Not provided by user-level approaches (DMP, CoreDet, Grace, Dthreads, etc.)

Determinator versus Linux



Elastic Cloud Scenario




Jobs: In Anytime, Out on a Schedule

For each customer (e.g., Alice):

- Deterministic execution ensures job output *bits* depend only on job input *bits*: $O_j = f(I_j)$
- Job outputs produced *in same order* as inputs
- At each “clock tick”, paced queue releases either ***next job output*** or says ***not ready yet***
 - The ***single bit of information*** per clock tick that might leak other users' information

Also supports **predictive mitigation** [CCS '11]

Informal "Schedule Analysis"



(b) Schedule: Bob's job short

(b) Schedule: Bob's job long

Key Challenges/Questions

- Formalize full TIFC model
 - Potentially applicable at systems or PL levels
 - Integrate Myers' “predictive mitigation” ideas
- Complete TIFC-enforcing prototype
 - Ongoing, based on Determinator [OSDI '10]
- Explore flexibility, applicability of model
 - Can model support interactive applications?
 - Can model support transactional apps?

Conclusion

First approach to timing channels control that:

- Works with *unmodified* hardware and software
- Works with *general* computing algorithms
- Supports stat-multiplexed elastic computing

More info: <http://dedis.cs.yale.edu/2010/det/>

- “Determinating Timing Channels” [CCSW '10]
- “Plugging Side-Channel Leaks” [HotCloud '12]
- “Efficient System-Enforced Det...” [OSDI '12]